

*1 Mr. Carver*  
*Course Panel*

Agenda

Issues for discussion with the DCI in the  
order in which they are to be discussed:

- I. Use of the Polygraph as a Clearance Requirement
- II. Creation of a National Intelligence Operations Center
- III.
- IV. Personnel Evaluation
- V. Resource Allocation for Improved Security
- VI. Personnel Management
- VII. Position Classification Authority

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## I. Use of Polygraph as a Clearance Requirement

1) Issue - All federal government and military services within the U. S. use E.O. 10450 and DCID 1/14 as the basic criteria upon which individuals are granted access to classified information, with E.O. 10450 setting forth the requirements for Confidential, Secret and Top Secret access and DCID 1/14 the criteria for access to Special Compartmented Information.

While there is unanimity in the acceptance of these guidelines, there is no standard throughout government with regard to using the polygraph as part of the clearance procedure. To be specific, the CIA and NSA are the only two agencies which use the polygraph in this manner, and even within these two agencies the extent of such use varies.

If one accepts the polygraph as a valid and valuable tool in determining one's suitability for access to classified information, then there should be a definite requirement that any U.S. citizen who will be granted access to a given level of classified information must be subjected to a polygraph every five years.

As it now stands, the CIA attempts to polygraph all staff employees, as well as any other individual given unescorted access to Agency facilities. Only recently the CIA began a program to polygraph selected contractor's employees. NSA, on the other hand, polygraphs all of their civilian and contractors' employees, but does not polygraph the military personnel assigned to NSA.

Since the purpose of the clearance process would seem to be the prevention of a Boyce/Lee or Edwin Moore case, it seems somewhat inconsistent that a multitude of military and civilian employees of the federal government are granted access to the same classified information, despite the fact that not all of these individuals have undergone the same scrutiny from a security standpoint.

2) Recommendation - The DCI, as head of the Intelligence Community and Chairman of the NRO, should institute a policy which requires that one undergo a polygraph examination on a five year cycle as part of routine security

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clearance processing for access to "Secret/Top Secret" and/or "Compartmented Information." This should include the following, in addition to those now being polygraphed, who will have such access:

- a) Staff employees of Congressional representatives
- b) Federal Bureau of Investigation employees
- c) Departments of State, Justice, etc.
- d) White House staff
- e) Contractors' employees

## II. Creation of a National Intelligence Operations Center

1) Background - An Intelligence Community Staff study is currently being conducted to establish a National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC) to centralize the various human and technical collection assets dispersed throughout the Intelligence Community into a more manageable, responsive mechanism for your control as DCI.

One of the National Intelligence Tasking Center's functions would be to provide a 24-hour tasking capability to provide collection and exploitation resources to support you in your national responsibilities to the President and the National Security Council Staff.

The National Foreign Assessments Center will provide you, as DCI, with a sole producer of national intelligence and its production analysts will be your principal source of independent judgments.

There is, however, a necessary bridge between national-level collection and exploitation and national-level production that has not been provided for in reorganization plans to date.

That bridge is a National Intelligence Operations Center structured along the lines of the NITC whereby you have in one organization all departmental operations

centers represented on a 24-hour basis to follow items of current intelligence interest. Those officers should have at their disposal what today is regarded as departmental, proprietary traffic and the power to brief the appropriate NIO, NFAC analyst and you, as DCI, on items of current and critical interest.

There is merit in such an organization in that all departmental organizations are represented and centrally located, the flow of information to your national production offices would be facilitated and the briefings that you receive would be timely and complete. Moreover you, as DCI, would have an existing national structure and information flow upon which to impose a National Intelligence Task Force during a crisis situation.

2) Recommendation - Consider the creation of a National Intelligence Operations Center proximate to you, the NIO's and NFAC analysts -- that is, at CIA Headquarters -- to bridge the gap between the national collection and national production reorganizations currently being planned.

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#### IV. Personnel Evaluation

1) Issue - Supervisors do not apply uniform standards in employee evaluations.

Performance evaluations, despite the use of standardized forms, are not well written. The narrative section will discuss such things as appearance, attitude, aggressiveness. Long narratives will focus

on a description of the job instead of discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the employee. If you do not happen to have a good writer as your supervisor, you are penalized for the brevity of the narrative or the lack of specific performance description. Frequently, supervisors use the language of past fitness reports and merely comment on issues raised in the past which have nothing to do with present performance.

2) Recommendation - Compulsory attendance for all supervisors but especially new supervisors at such courses as Performance Evaluation Workshop, Fundamentals of Supervision and Management or Supervisory Skills and denial of an employee's personnel file for use in writing a current fitness report.

#### V. Resource Allocation for Improved Security

1) Issue - While it is clear that the DCI's actions with regard to rectifying problems related to industrial security on CIA contracts has led to tremendous efforts on behalf of private industry to improve security, little has been done to free Agency monies to improve our own security posture. As you know, based on the recent security audits of Agency contractors, each has now dedicated large sums of their own money to improve both personnel and physical security.

Within the Agency, it remains extremely difficult to obtain funds to purchase approved safes, hire new security personnel, and to generally improve upon the Agency's security practices. While this is not a problem within the Headquarters building, it is a problem when one looks at the security stature of other CIA buildings, both domestically and abroad. The problem stems from a lack of understanding of where the weaknesses are located, but as indicated, in obtaining money from the responsible directorate's budget to take corrective action.

2) Recommendation - The DCI reaffirm to all Agency directorates the importance of maintaining excellent security standards, and assure each directorate that funds will be made available to correct security deficiencies. As a possible vehicle for such funds, consideration should be given to providing all funds for security to the Office of Security, which could then distribute the funds without affecting an already determined directorate(s) budget.

## VI. Personnel Management

1) Issue - Should Career Evaluation Panels use position headroom (slots) to determine promotions or overall Directorate headroom as the DDO does?

The use of overall Directorate headroom allows a panel to reward an employee based on performance regardless of slot. He is competitive with all others of that grade and not locked in. However, the categories of the employees may not always be reasonable such as a specialists grouping where you are comparing small numbers of unrelated specialists based on fitness reports.

Promotions within slots follow Civil Service Commission guidelines which state if you are doing a job whose level of difficulty warrants a specific grade, then you should be eligible for that grade. If you are slot bound and outstanding then you should be given a different position which allows headroom or the position should be reclassified if the duties have expanded. However, this can lead to slot manipulation by managers with employees reslotted at whim to meet a certain situation.

2) Recommendation - Study the two issues carefully before putting the Agency under one system. Some positions may lend themselves to overall headroom and others may not. Don't lock Directorates into one or the other.

## VII. Position Classification Authority

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A recent review of selected occupational series in CIA, in response to OMB Bulletin No. 77-11, 28 June 1977, subject: Controlling Grade Escalation in the General Schedule, revealed that the average grade for most series' studied was higher than the government-wide average grade for comparable series'. Taking into consideration the very real differences of mission, employee mix, and in some cases function, the study showed that some of the occupations in CIA should be reviewed very carefully as targets for average grade reduction.

The principle of equal pay for equal work in CIA, whether internal or external comparisons are used, has been eroded in some instances. Part of the reason for this is the lack of defined classification authority.

Recommendations -

a) That the Director of Personnel, through PMCD, exercise the authority to reclassify positions at the time they are reviewed, if they are found to be over-graded or undergraded.

b) That a clearly defined appeals channel be developed through which the manager can go if he disagrees with classification decisions implemented by the Director of Personnel.